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Protecting judicial independence through appointments processes: a review of the 
Indian and South African experiences. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Judicial appointments processes have attracted a significant amount of attention over the 
last two decades. The rise in interest in, and debate about, how judges are appointed has 
been attributed to a global increase in judicial power.1 Where once judges were viewed as 
simply not being important enough for the manner by which they were selected to merit 
serious scrutiny, the expansion of judicial power has served to heighten political, 
scholarly and public interest in this issue.2 Recent years have also witnessed a move 
toward judicial appointment commissions, at least in Commonwealth states. 3 The 2005 
Commonwealth Guidelines on the Three Branches of Government (the Latimer House 
Guidelines) support an emerging view of commissions-based appointments processes as 
best practice.4 Thus, whilst the Guidelines allow for the possibility of other processes, 
they also suggest that a judicial appointments commission be set up in states with no 
existing independent process. 
 
 If judicial appointments processes in Commonwealth states are viewed as existing 
along a spectrum with a general move away from executive control towards commission-
based systems, the Indian approach to judicial appointments may be seen as an outlier. In 
India, judges have primacy in the judicial appointments process. The judiciary 
recommends nominees for judicial appointment to the President through its “collegiums” 
– made up of the Chief Justice (CJ) and two or four senior judges –  and the President is 
bound by the decision of the Collegium.5 By contrast, South Africa was one of the 
frontrunners in the move towards appointment by commission, with a Judicial Service 
Commission (JSC) consisting of senior representatives of the judiciary, the executive and 
the legal profession being created under the country’s 1996 Constitution in a series of 
profound constitutional changes following the end of apartheid.  
 
                                                 
1  Kate Malleson ‘Introduction’ in Kate Malleson and Peter Russell (eds) Appointing Judges in an Age 
of Judicial Power (Toronto University Press 2006) 3. 
2  See, for example Malleson and Russell (n 1), J van Zyl Smit The Appointment, Tenure and Removal 
of Judges under Commonwealth Principles: A Compendium and Analysis of Best Practice (Report 
of Research Undertaken by the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law 2015); Graham Gee and Erika 
Rackley (eds) Debating Judicial Appointments in an Age of Diversity (Taylor and Francis 2017); 
and Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg ‘Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial 
Independence’ (2009) 57 American Journal of Comparative Law 103. 
3  See Jan van Zyl Smit ‘Judicial appointments in the Commonwealth: is India Bucking the Trend?’ 
U.K. Const. L. Blog (7th Mar 2016) < https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/03/07/jan-van-zyl-
smit-judicial-appointments-in-the-commonwealth-is-india-bucking-the-trend/> accessed 12 
November 2017. 
4  Guideline II.I. <http://www.cpahq.org/cpahq/cpadocs/Latimer%20House%20Principles.pdf> 
accessed 12 November 2017. 
5  ‘Recasting the Judicial Appointments Debate’ Centre for Law and Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 1/2014 < http://www.nja.nic.in/P-950_Reading_Material_5-NOV-
15/3.Judicial%20Appointments%20Debate.pdf > accessed 12 November 2017.   
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Despite representing vastly different ways of appointing judges, India’s collegium 
system and South Africa’s JSC have both come under fire for being unequal to the job of 
protecting judicial independence. In South Africa, there is increasing disquiet that the 
composition of the JSC6 has allowed a powerful executive to exert undue influence over 
the appointment of superior court judges.7 Allegations of executive dominance of judicial 
appointments – particularly appointments to the Constitutional Court – have dogged the 
South African judicial appointments system for some time. The appointment of the 
current Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng in 2011 was especially fraught. Richard Calland 
notes that the main reason for Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke – an eminent jurist – being 
passed over twice for the position of CJ by President Zuma’s administration is that he 
was quoted in 2008 as saying that he intended to use his remaining ten or twelve years as 
a judge to help create an equal society: ‘It’s not what the ANC8 wants…it is about what is 
good for the people’.9 The idea that potential candidates will find themselves consigned 
to the lower courts or kept out of the highest judicial positions if they are critical of the 
ruling party is extremely worrying, particularly in a country with no real opposition to the 
dominant political party.10  
In India, the collegium system has resulted in a lack of transparency about selection 
criteria and widespread concern over weak judicial accountability. The absence of clear 
criteria for judicial selection has also left judicial appointments open to executive 
influence, the very thing that collegium system was purportedly aimed at preventing. 
Criticisms of this judicial control over judicial appointments11 culminated in much-
anticipated reform in 2014. However, in October 2015, the Supreme Court found the 
Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 (99th Amendment) and the National 
Judicial Appointments Commission Act of 2014, which were intended to move the 
country to a commission-based process, to be unconstitutional on the basis that the 
proposed system would damage the independence of the judiciary. 12  The decision has 
met with a mixed response. On the one hand, that the promise of a more transparent 
judicial appointments system has not come to fruition is hugely disappointing.13 On the 
                                                 
6  Koos Malan ‘Reassessing Judicial Independence and Impartiality against the Background of Judicial 
Appointments in South Africa’ 2014 (17) 5 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1965, 1968-69. 
7  See Cora Hoexter and Morné Olivier ‘The Judicial Service Commission’ in C Hoexter and M 
Olivier (eds) The Judiciary in South Africa (Juta 2014) 154, 169-70. 
8  The African National Congress, South Africa’s ruling party since 1994. 
9  The Zuma Years – South Africa’s Changing Face of Power (Zebra Press 2013) chapter 11. 
10  See further, John McEldowney ‘One-party Dominance and Democratic Constitutionalism in South 
Africa’ (2013) J. S. Afr. L. 269; Samuel Issacharoff ‘Constitutional Courts and Consolidated Power’ 
(2014) 62 Am. J. Comp. L. 585, 604-08 especially; Mark Tushnet ‘Preserving Judicial 
Independence in Dominant Party States’, (2015-2016) 60 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 107.  
11  See, for example, Prashant Bhushan ‘Securing Judicial Accountability: Towards an Independent 
Commission’ Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 42, No. 43 (Oct. 27 - Nov. 2, 2007) 14; and 
Markandey Katju ‘Let’s make judges selection more transparent’, The Hindu (Chennai, 3 January 
2013) <http://www.thehindu.com> accessed 12 November 2017. 
12  Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association and others v Union of India and others, WP (Cl) 
13/2015 (Supreme Court, 16 October 2015). 
13  See Raju Ramachandran ‘Judicial Independence and the Appointment of Judges’ DAKSH Fourth 
Annual Constitution Day Lecture, Indian Institute for Human Settlements (IIHS) Auditorium, 28 
November 2015 <http://blog.dakshindia.org/2015/12/judicial-independence-and-
appointment.html> accessed 12 November 2017. 
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other, even those broadly in favour of reform of the judicial appointments system found 
themselves reluctant to get behind the NJAC Act because of the fundamental concern that 
it did not do enough to insulate the commission process from executive control.14 Whilst 
the decision was disappointing to those who have been pressing for a move towards a 
commission-based process in India for decades, the issues highlighted in the judgment 
are a timely reminder that the composition and functioning of a judicial appointments 
commission are matters that merit careful consideration.  
 
It is here that the South African experience makes for illuminating comparative 
analysis and, it is argued in this article, is something of a cautionary tale. From a political 
perspective, India and South Africa are very different. The African National Congress 
(ANC) has been the majority party in South Africa since the first democratic elections in 
1994. By contrast, 2014 was the first time in 25 years that a single party (the Bharatiya 
Janata Party) managed to secure a majority in India. India is a much more populous state 
with a GDP placing it within the six biggest economies in the world.15 Whilst South 
Africa is an economic powerhouse regionally, its economic growth has been small by 
global standards. Where racial discrimination continues to be one of the most pressing 
social issues in South Africa, it is the caste system in India that has given rise to many 
diversity concerns. At the same time, there are good reasons why the comparison of 
judicial appointments processes in the two countries is useful. Historically, India’s 
collegium and South Africa’s JSC may both be said to be a response to executive 
intrusion into judicial appointments.16 In both countries, the courts – the Supreme Court 
and Constitutional Court, in particular – have been active17 in protecting the economic 
and social interests of those most marginalised in society, in the context of deep-seated 
and pervasive inequality. Strong judicial review powers are a feature of the judicial 
systems in both jurisdictions. Where judicial legitimacy is important in any jurisdiction, it 
is especially important that courts with such comparatively strong powers, be seen to be 
independent. Concerns about judicial diversity and the quality of judicial reasoning are 
features of both these systems. An appointments process that protects judicial 
independence, contributes to diversity and ensures that excellent candidates are 
nominated and selected is therefore vital.  
 
Both countries are currently encumbered by flawed systems for judicial selection and 
appointment. In the case of South Africa, the composition of the JSC has led to a 
disturbing level of political influence over judicial appointments.18 Later commissions in 
                                                 
14  Indira Jaising ‘National Judicial Appointments Commission: A Critique’ Economic and Political 
Weekly, Vol. XLIX No. 35 (30 August 2014) 16, 18. 
15  According to 2016 World Bank data. See <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf> 
accessed 12 November 2017. South Africa was placed 38 in this ranking. 
16  See further Granville Austin Working a Democratic Constitution (OUP 2003), chapter 25 and 
Morné Olivier ‘The selection and appointment of judges’ in Hoexter and Olivier (n 7) 116, 117-8.  
17  Though not consistently so – see, for example, Anashri Pillay and Murray Wesson ‘Recession, 
recovery and service delivery: political and judicial responses to the financial and economic crisis in 
South Africa’ in A Nolan (ed) Economic and Social Rights after the Financial Crisis (CUP 2014) 
335 and the text to note 70 below. 
18  Though the transparency of certain aspects of the process has helped to mitigate the impact of this 
political pressure – discussed further below. 
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other jurisdictions have been more balanced in the sense that they are not dominated by 
members of the judiciary or by politicians.19 But, for South Africa, the composition of the 
JSC may only be changed through constitutional amendment. This is unlikely to happen 
for as long as the ANC maintains its majority in Parliament.20 Despite this fairly bleak 
assessment, it is worth noting the JSC has been responsive to forceful civil society 
demands that it publish clearer selection criteria and conduct interviews that are both fair 
and robust. In the absence of a more balanced commission, it is especially important that 
this insistence on a transparent and rigorous process be maintained.  
 
Change to the collegium system in India has also proved elusive. The Indian Supreme 
Court’s decision in the NJAC case suggests that there is a deep-seated reluctance to move 
away from judicial primacy in the appointments process.  Furthermore, there is little 
clarity in the decision about the kind of commission-based process that would survive 
constitutional challenge. Thus, the shape of future reforms of the judicial appointments 
system in India is uncertain. The South African experience underscores the fact that a 
move to a commission-based process cannot, in itself, be considered a victory for judicial 
independence.  Much more careful attention must be paid to achieving a balance in the 
composition of the commission. Ideally, legislation creating such bodies and detailing 
their procedures will also contribute greater clarity to selection criteria and promote 
transparency and rigour in judicial interviews. Where this is missing, it is important that 
civil society organisations, legal practitioners, scholars and the media all play a role in 
holding commissions to account for their decisions.  
 
 
2. Historical background to appointments processes in India and South Africa 
As noted above, India’s collegium system and South Africa’s JSC may both be seen as 
responses to concerns about political dominance over judicial appointments. The 
response in India was a move toward judicial primacy, which was not explicitly ordained 
in the Constitution. When the Constitution was enacted, the Constitutional Assembly was 
keen to ensure that the executive did not dominate the judicial appointments process but 
they also did not want the judiciary to function as a power unto itself.21 Thus, a ‘middle 
course’22 was adopted. Under Article 124 (2), the President bears the responsibility for 
appointing judges to the Supreme Court but can do so only ‘after consultation with such 
of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States as the President 
may deem necessary for the purpose’. In all appointments other than that of CJ, the 
sitting CJ must be consulted.23 Similarly, under Article 217, the President appoints judges 
                                                 
19  This balance has been achieved by including practising lawyers and lay persons on the commissions 
– see Jan van Zyl Smit ‘“Opening up” Commonwealth Judicial Appointments to Diversity? The 
Growing Role of Commissions in Judicial Selection’ in Gee and Rackley (n 2) 68. 
20  See Olivier (n 16) 152. See also Hoexter and Olivier (n 7) 172 on calls for, and proposals regarding 
reform of the JSC. 
21 See, for instance, the statement made by B.R. Ambedkar, a principal drafter of the Constitution who 
went on to become India’s first Law Minister, cited by Judge Khehar in the NJAC judgment (n 12) 
par. 30 (The Reference Order). 
22  Ibid. 
23  The Constitution of India, Art 124. 
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to the High Court ‘after consultation with’ the ‘Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the 
State, and, in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief 
Justice of the High Court’.  
The key issue, of course, was what the duty to consult meant. The question 
initially came before the Court in S.P. Gupta v. President of India,24 the First Judges 
case, in 1981. In that case, the Supreme Court judges noted that judicial independence 
was part of the basic structure of the Constitution and therefore could not be restricted by 
government.25 The court went on to find, per Bhagwati J, that, when it came to 
appointments to the Supreme Court, full consultation with the CJ was imperative. 
Furthermore, it was to be expected that the opinion of the CJ, as head of the judiciary, 
would carry significant weight.26 However, the Court was clear that the opinion of the CJ 
did not have primacy over those of other constitutional functionaries.27 The central 
government was not bound to act consistently with the opinion of the members of the 
judiciary consulted in the process.28 Acknowledging that leaving the appointment of 
superior court judges ultimately in the hands of the executive was not ‘ideal’, Justice 
Bhagwati went on to note that the system was preferred because it furthered 
accountability.  The executive could be held to account to the legislature – and thus, 
indirectly, to the electorate – for its choices regarding judicial selection.29  
However, when the Supreme Court next came to consider the matter in 1993, the 
judges took an entirely different approach. In the Second Judges case, 30 the majority held 
that, by making consultation with senior members of the judiciary an essential element of 
the President’s power to appoint judges, the Constitution signalled a departure from the 
earlier process in terms of which the executive had absolute discretion over judicial 
selection.31 For this departure to be meaningful and in order to ‘eliminate political 
influence’32 over the process, the executive could not be given the final say over the 
suitability of judicial candidates for appointment. 
                                                 
24  AIR 1982 SC 149. 
25  The basic feature or structure doctrine may be traced to Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and 
Ors v State of Kerala and another AIR 1973 SC 1461. In that case, the Court held that the 
legislative power to amend the Constitution was limited to the extent that an amendment could not 
violate one of the basic features or the basic structure of the Constitution. The court found that the 
separation of powers amongst legislative, executive and judicial arms of government were basic 
features of the Constitution. In the later case of State of Rajasthan v Union of India AIR 1977 SC 
1361, the Court found that the independence of the judiciary was a basic feature of the Constitution. 
See, further, O. Reddy The Court and the Constitution of India: Summits and Shallows (OUP 2008) 
at 61-64. 
26  First Judges case (n 24) par. 30. 
27  Ibid. In reaching this conclusion, Bhagwati J referred to Ambedkar’s description of a transfer of 
power to the CJ as a ‘dangerous proposition’ - First Judges case (n 24) par. 29. 
28  First Judges case (n 24) par. 29. 
29  Ibid. 
30  Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441 par. 41 (per 
Justice Verma for the majority). 
31  Second Judges case (n 30) par. 37 (per Verma J). 
32  Second Judges case (n 30) par. 40 (per Verma J). 
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Having rejected the idea of the executive exercising a determinative voice over 
judicial appointments, the court noted: 
The primary aim must be to reach an agreed decision taking into account the views of all 
the consultees, giving the greatest weight to the opinion of the Chief Justice of India who, 
as earlier stated, is best suited to know the worth of the appointee. No question of primacy 
would arise when the decision is reached in this manner by consensus, without any 
difference of opinion. However, if conflicting opinions emerge at the end of the 
process…primacy must…lie in the final opinion of the Chief Justice of India, unless for 
very good reasons known to the executive and disclosed to the Chief Justice of India, that 
appointment is not considered to be suitable.33 
This effective judicial primacy was endorsed in 1998 when the Supreme Court handed 
down an Advisory Opinion in the Third Judges case34 prescribing a distinct process of 
appointment of judges to the senior courts. The Court held that, for appointments to the 
Supreme Court, the Chief Justice of India’s recommendation, which has primacy, must 
be made in consultation with the ‘four seniormost puisne Judges in the Supreme Court’. 
For High Court appointments, the CJ had to consult with the ‘two seniormost puisne 
Judges of the Supreme Court’.35 These consultative groups, referred to as collegiums, 
have since acted as the vehicle through which senior court judges are selected.  
 
That the Supreme Court could depart from the reasoning in the First Judges case 
and, as some have argued, effectively ‘rewrite’36 the Constitution by transferring the 
power of judicial selection to the judges themselves seems remarkable. However, these 
developments must be read against the political and constitutional climate in the decades 
following the 1975-77 state of emergency. Whilst it effectively upheld executive control 
over judicial appointments, the decision in the First Judges case was handed down in the 
context of an ‘ever-simmering’ debate about judicial independence.37 Government’s 
actions with respect to the supersession of and transfer of judges immediately before and 
during the Emergency meant that post-emergency governmental policies with respect to 
the judiciary were treated with a high degree of suspicion by judges, lawyers and the 
members of the public.38   
This suspicion was heightened by several events from the mid-1980s contributing 
to the perception of governmental disdain for judicial independence. Austin notes that the 
Law Minister, expressed approval for the possibility that the chief justice of each high 
court be appointed from outside its jurisdiction. Government statements suggested that it 
favoured greater movement of judges. Rather than consulting with the High Court’s chief 
justice, the governor of Uttar Pradesh wrote to the Law Ministry, indicating that the 
extension of Justice Srivastava’s appointment was undesirable. For his part, Justice 
                                                 
33  Second Judges case (n 30) par. 41 (per Verma J). 
34  Special Reference No. 1 of 1998 (1998) 7 SCC 729. The government of India was not seeking to 
overturn the decision in the Second Judges case but merely asked for clarification on matters of 
process. See further Arghya Sengupta ‘Judicial Independence and the Appointment of Judges to the 
Higher Judiciary: A Conceptual Enquiry’ (2011) 5 Indian Journal of Constitutional Law 99, 103-4. 
35  Working paper (n 5) 3-4. 
36  Working paper (n 5) 3. See also Reddy (n 25) 305. 
37  Austin (n 16) 517. 
38  Ibid. 
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Srivastava made it clear that he considered the short renewal of his tenure to be 
connected to the fact that he represented Raj Narain in a case brought against Indira 
Gandhi for election fraud before the declaration of emergency in 1975.39 A series of 
transfers of judges emanating from correspondence between Chief Justice Chandrachud 
and Shiv Shankar as well as disputes regarding tenure placed additional pressure on the 
situation leading to increased calls for an impartial appointments and transfer process.40 
By the time the Second Judges case came to be decided, and following criticisms of the 
First Judges case as being overly deferential to an executive keen on encroaching into the 
judicial domain,41 the political context had changed enough to allow the judges to act 
decisively in securing judicial primacy over appointments.  
 South Africa’s move to a commission-based appointments system arose several 
decades later, following the dismantling of apartheid in the mid-1990s. The establishment 
of a JSC, independent from government and responsible for the selection of judicial 
candidates, was one of many fundamental changes effected by South Africa’s 1996 
Constitution. Under apartheid, judicial appointments were an executive affair. The 
processes for appointment of judges were largely based on those inherited from the 
former colonial power, the United Kingdom. Judges were appointed by the President 
acting on the advice of the Minister of Justice.42 The system was heavily criticised. As 
stated by Hugh Corder during the country’s transition to a democratic form of 
government: 
First, it is clear that the present informal, secret and unaccountable method employed in 
South Africa will have to disappear, not only because it is secret and substantially 
unregulated by the law, but also because it is susceptible to abuse and political pressure and 
because it has been abandoned in almost every other country.43 
Studies conducted under apartheid demonstrated that judges were excessively willing to 
uphold executive action at the expense of individual freedoms. Many judges supported 
the system of apartheid. Furthermore, there were ‘a number of very obviously political 
appointments’ to the bench, used as a means for Government to sustain its discriminatory 
policies. 44 Thus, where fears of a lack of respect for judicial independence informed the 
development of the collegium system in India in the 1980s, the move to a JSC in South 
Africa was precipitated by more blatant political interference with appointments by 
apartheid governments. 
 
  The introduction of a commissions-based system for judicial appointments in 
South Africa was welcomed both as part of a general trend towards a ‘culture of 
                                                 
39  These and other events are described in detail by Austin (n 16) 517-21. 
40  Austin (n 16) 521-3. 
41  Reddy (n 25) 304. Reddy argues that, by this time, the Supreme Court had realised the ‘great 
mistake it had committed in the First Judges case’. 
42  François Du Bois ‘Judicial Selection in Post-Apartheid South Africa’ in Malleson and Russell (n 1) 
280, 283. 
43  ‘The Appointment of Judges: Some Comparative Ideas’ (1992) (2) Stellenbosch Law Review 207, 
226. 
44  Geoffrey Bindman ‘Preliminary Report on South Africa’ (1987) 38 International Commission of 
Jurists Review 31, 46. See also Olivier (n 16) 118-20. 
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justification’45 and as an attempt to address specific concerns over judicial independence.  
Given the country’s history of discrimination, diversification of the judiciary was also an 
immediate priority. The Constitution requires that the ‘need for the judiciary to reflect 
broadly the racial and gender composition of South Africa’ be considered in the 
appointments process.46 The procedures for the appointment of judges to the higher 
courts are set out in section 174. The CJ and Deputy Chief Justice are appointed by the 
President ‘after consulting the Judicial Service Commission and the leader of parties 
represented in the National Assembly’.47 The President appoints the President and 
Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Appeal after consulting with the JSC.48 Other 
judges of the Constitutional Court are appointed by the President according to the 
following process: 
a. The Judicial Service Commission must prepare a list of nominees with three names more 
than the number of appointments to be made, and submit the list to the President b. The 
President may make appointments from the list, and must advise the Judicial Service 
Commission, with reasons, if any of the nominees are unacceptable and any appointment 
remains to be made c. The Judicial Service Commission must supplement the list with further 
nominees and the President must make the remaining appointments from the supplemented 
list.49 
Finally, judges of other courts are appointed by the President on the advice of the JSC.50 
Thus, the JSC is a ‘hybrid’ institution in the sense that it has the power only to make 
recommendations to the President in certain cases but also has the power to decide on 
nominees for the positions of ordinary Constitutional Court Justices.51  
 
 Of course, the composition of the JSC is key to any discussion of judicial 
independence. Section 178 of the Constitution provides: 
1. There is a Judicial Service Commission consisting of 
a. the Chief Justice, who presides at meetings of the Commission; 
b. the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal;  
c. one Judge President designated by the Judges President;  
d. the Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice, or an alternate designated 
by that Cabinet member;  
e. two practising advocates nominated from within the advocates' profession to represent the 
profession as a whole, and appointed by the President;  
f. two practising attorneys nominated from within the attorneys' profession to represent the 
profession as a whole, and appointed by the President;  
g. one teacher of law designated by teachers of law at South African universities;  
h. six persons designated by the National Assembly from among its members, at least three of 
whom must be members of opposition parties represented in the Assembly;  
i. four permanent delegates to the National Council of Provinces designated together by the 
Council with a supporting vote of at least six provinces;  
j. four persons designated by the President as head of the national executive, after consulting 
                                                 
45  Etienne Mureinik A bridge to where? Introducing the interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 31, 32 
46  Section 174 (2). 
47  Section 174(3). 
48  Ibid. 
49  Section 174 (4). 
50  Section 174 (6). 
51  Du Bois (n 42) 285. 
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the leaders of all the parties in the National Assembly; and  
k. when considering matters relating to a specific High Court, the Judge President of that 
Court and the Premier of the province concerned, or an alternate designated by each of them.  
 
Whilst the JSC is formally separate from the executive, the manner of its 
composition ‘would ordinarily secure a dominant position for the ruling party’.52 Twelve 
of the twenty-three members of the Commission normally part of the decision-making 
process are politicians appointed by the President53 who is both Head of State and Head 
of the National Executive.54 When there are vacancies to be filled, the JSC publishes a 
notice providing details of these and asking for nominations. It then shortlists appropriate 
candidates and asks them to attend an interview. There is an opportunity for public 
comment or representations to be made to the JSC before the interviews. Importantly, the 
interviews are held in public but deliberations and decision-making are conducted in 
private.55  
 
The South African model has been praised as having many positive attributes.56 
Whilst transformation of the demographic make-up of the judiciary remains a challenge 
for the JSC, 57 particularly with the higher Courts, significant progress has been made 
since 1994.58 According to Department of Justice statistics, black judges (‘African’, 
‘Coloured’ and ‘Indian’) made up 63% of the bench in 2014, with African judges 
constituting 44% of that group. This is a definite improvement on the 57% of black 
judges, including 39% African judges, in 2009. Achieving greater gender diversity has 
been a slower process, with the number of women on the bench increasing from 23% in 
2009 to 32 % in 2014.59 These achievements are particularly notable when one considers 
that in 1994, 160 of the 165 judges on the South African bench were white men.60 The 
                                                 
52  Malan (n 6) 1968-69. 
53  Ibid. 
54  See, further, Hoexter and Olivier (n 7)167-8. They note that the preponderance of executive 
members is inconsistent with the trend with respect to the composition of commissions in African 
states and the rest of the world. 
55  For a more detailed summary of the process, see Penny Andrews ‘The South African Judicial 
Appointments Process’ (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 565, 568-9; Olivier (n 16) 123-31. 
56  See, for instance Jeffrey Jowell ‘The Appointment and Accountability of Judges’ Helen Suzman 
Foundation lecture <http://hsf.org.za/siteworkspace/hsf-justice-lecture.pdf> accessed 12 
November 2017. See also Andrews (n 55) 569. 
57  A full discussion of the meaning of diversity and arguments for its importance are beyond the scope 
of this article. See, further, Morné Olivier ‘A Perspective on Gender Transformation of the South 
African Judiciary’ (2013) 130 S. African L.J. 448; and Erika Rackley ‘In Conversation with Lord 
Justice Etherton: Revisiting the Case for a More Diverse Judiciary’ (2010) Public Law 655. 
58  See Du Bois (n 42) 287; P De Vos ‘Judicial transformation: South Africa's appalling non-
commitment’, Daily Maverick, 22 January 2013,<http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2013-
01-22-judicial-transformation-south-africas-appalling-non-commitment/#.V3-Vn1du5SU> accessed 
12 November 2017; and Andries Nel ‘The Legal Practice Bill and the Transformation of the Legal 
Profession’, 10 May 2013 <http://www.justice.gov.za/docs/articles/20130510-dm-
tranformation.html> accessed 12 November 2017. 
59  Nomthandazo Ntlama ‘The Transformation of the South African Judiciary: a Measure to Weaken its 
Capacity?’ at 9 <http://www.nylslawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/10/Ntlama.pdf> 
accessed 12 April 2017. Statistics for the demographic profile of the Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal are available at 10-11. See further Olivier (n 11). 
60  Ibid. See also Nel (n 58). 
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transparency of the selection and appointment process and the enhanced accountability 
that stems from this is another of the JSC’s merits. As Du Bois comments: 
Twice a year, the JSC conducts well-publicized open interviews, following widely-
distributed calls for applications for judicial vacancies and published lists of candidates 
inviting comments. It consults with, and elicits views from, the judiciary and legal 
profession, and its proceedings and decisions are reported and commented on in the 
media.61 
 
Given the composition of the JSC, the potential for executive influence over judicial 
appointments is clear. But it is also important to note that South Africa’s commission was 
the product of a late political compromise. Hoexter and Olivier provide a salutary 
reminder that, at one point, the proposal was that the JSC have no role in the appointment 
of Constitutional Court judges.62 Thus, whilst the composition of the JSC is not ideal, it 
was perhaps the best option that could have come out of the constitutional negotiations. 
In contrast to India, the detailed provisions in the South African Constitution also meant 
that the appointments process was constitutionally fixed and not open to interpretation by 
the Constitutional Court. 
3. The case for reform 
In light of the historical context sketched above, both the move to a collegium system in 
India and the introduction of a JSC in South Africa may been seen as victories for judicial 
independence. However, there are convincing arguments for reform of the current 
judicial appointments systems in both countries.  Writing shortly before the Third Judges 
case was decided, leading Indian constitutional law scholar S.P. Sathe noted that 
proposals for a judicial selection commission had already been under discussion for some 
time. Such a commission would have had a range of constitutional actors as members and 
would have conducted the appointment, transfer and removal of judges according to a 
clear set of rules. Sathe argued that judicial accountability was as important as judicial 
independence and that, to further this accountability, ‘[t]he people must know who are 
appointed as judges and what are the criteria for such appointments.’ 63 The problem with 
a judge-dominated process is that it does not do enough to protect this accountability and 
is, therefore, anti-democratic.64 In the intervening years, the issue of a lack of 
transparency and accountability has been an enduring critique of the Indian judiciary.65 
Furthermore, various controversies over appointments to the Indian courts indicate that 
the primary rationale for self-selection – protection of judicial independence – is not 
necessarily served by the current process. Chief Justices are not immune from executive 
                                                 
61  Du Bois (n 42) 288. 
62  Hoexter and Olivier (n 7) 156. 
63  SP Sathe ‘Appointment of Judges: The Issues’ Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 33, No. 32 
(Aug. 8-14, 1998) 2155, 2157. 
64  Ibid. 
65  Supriya Routh ‘Independence Sans Accountability: A Case for Right to Information against the 
Indian Judiciary’ (2014) 13 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 321, 342. See also 
Bhushan (n 10); Abhinav Chandrachud ‘The Insulation of India's Constitutional Judiciary’ 
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 45, No. 13 (March 27-April 2, 2010) 38.  
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influence and the existing system contains no means by which they can be checked if 
they do give in to political pressure.66   
Even where the CJ or other senior judges are themselves resistant to political 
influence over the appointments decisions, without clear criteria and a transparent process 
for appointment there are other means by which the executive can interfere. The 
treatment of Gopal Subramanian, who the Supreme Court collegium was considering for 
appointment to the Supreme Court in 2014, illustrates the point. Subramanian’s 
involvement in certain cases – particularly those in which he represented the Central 
Bureau of Investigation (CBI) – made him unpopular with the Bharatiya Janata Party-led 
National Democratic Alliance government. The government effectively thwarted his 
appointment by instigating a ‘smear campaign’ in the media.67 The collegium had 
unanimously recommended Subramanian for appointment. The standard procedure would 
have been for the government to send the nomination back to the collegium. If the 
collegium had then reiterated the decision, the government would have been compelled to 
make the appointment. Instead, government simply delayed. Believing that these actions 
had the support of the CJ, Subramanian withdrew his consent to his nomination and 
refuted the allegations made against him. 68  
 
It should be borne in mind that the Indian judiciary has also struggled with a lack of 
diversity. Whilst there has been some attempt to ensure geographical diversity on the 
bench, the Supreme Court is largely homogenous in terms of gender, race and caste.69 
Finally, vast inconsistencies in approach amongst judges on the Supreme Court, in 
particular, have cast a shadow over its jurisprudence in recent years.70 This is not to say 
that the judges of the Supreme Court need to speak with one voice. What Nick Robinson 
refers to as the court’s ‘polyvocality’ has certain benefits, such as allowing the judges an 
unusual capacity for innovation.71 Increasingly, however, commentators are objecting to 
more fundamental discrepancies amongst judgments.  
 
                                                 
66  Nirmalendu Bikash Rakshit ‘Judicial Appointments’ Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 
27 (Jul. 3-9, 2004) 2959, 2960. See also Prashant Bhushan ‘The Dinakaran Imbroglio: 
Appointments and Complaints against Judges’ Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 44, No. 41/42 
(October 10-23, 2009) 10. 
67  Prashant Bhushan ‘Scuttling Inconvenient Judicial Appointments’ Economic and Political Weekly, 
Vol. XLIX No. 28 (July 12, 2014) 12. 
68  Bhushan (n 67) 12-13. 
69   Abhinav Chandrachud ‘Age, seniority, diversity’ Frontline, Vol. 30 (8) (20 April–3 May 2013) 
<http://www.frontline.in/cover-story/age-seniority-diversity/article4613881.ece> accessed 12 
November 2017. See also Chandrachud The Informal Constitution: Unwritten Criteria in 
Selecting Judges for the Supreme Court of India (OUP 2014) 257-8. 
70  JK Krishnan, ‘The Rights of the New Untouchables: A Constitutional Analysis of HIV 
Jurisprudence in India’ (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 719, 791-819; S Shankar and P Mehta 
‘Courts and Socioeconomic Rights in India’ in V Gauri and D Brink (eds) Courting Social Justice: 
Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World (CUP 2008) 146; and 
Anashri Pillay ‘Judicial Activism and the Indian Supreme Court: Lessons for Economic and Social 
Rights Adjudication’ in Liora Lazarus, Christopher McCrudden and Nigel Bowles (eds) Reasoning 
Rights: Comparative Judicial Engagement (Hart Publishing 2014) 339. 
71  ‘Structure Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the Indian and U.S. Supreme Courts’ (2013) 
61 American Journal of Comparative Law 173, 184-86 and 188. 
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In a 2013 article for the Indian news and current affairs magazine Frontline, Mohan 
Gopal72 argued that the courts’ approach to social change has changed dramatically since 
1991. He noted that ‘courts are not as forthcoming or responsive as they used to be in 
defending the causes of the poor’.73 The courts – and the Supreme Court, in particular – 
appear to have embraced a model of social change that focuses on ‘market-based 
economic growth’ rather than the ‘redistribution of wealth or breaking down social 
oligopolies as envisaged in the Constitution’.74 And despite arguing that there is a general 
coherence to the Supreme Court’s judgments, Robinson also notes that ‘[i]n public 
interest litigation, certain judges are known for intervening aggressively when they see 
lapses in governance, while others rarely sanction intervention.’75 
 
These inconsistencies cannot simply be laid at the door of the judicial 
appointments system. The number of Supreme Court judges is unusually high. There are 
currently 25 sitting justices on the bench, including the Chief Justice. The relaxed rules of 
standing and a liberal approach to admissibility of cases has resulted in a large case-load.  
Many judgments are now being handed down by two-judge Division Benches: ‘[a]s the 
pool of precedent has grown, courts and counsel have been unable to keep pace with such 
growth, which inevitably leads to inconsistency in the law.’76 The judicial appointments 
process may not be as significant a contributor to inconsistency as these other factors. But 
judicial inconsistencies add fuel to concerns about the opacity of the appointments 
system. And this, in turn does damage to judicial legitimacy. 
 
Despite the heightened transparency of the system and greater demographic 
diversity of the bench in South Africa, there is also increasing disquiet over threats to 
judicial independence related to the manner in which judges are appointed. Penny 
Andrews notes that ‘concern has been raised about the nature of the sifting process and 
the shortlisting of candidates by the sub-committee of the JSC. Since the names of those 
who are nominated, but not shortlisted, are not published, questions have been raised 
about how the choices are made and whether political and other inappropriate influences 
play a part in the decision.’77  The JSC’s appointments have been critiqued from the very 
early years of its existence.78 A significant amount of this criticism stems from a 
perceived tension between the broad criteria for appointments recognised by the 
Constitution, that is that the candidate must be an ‘appropriately qualified woman or man 
                                                 
72  Former Director of the National Judicial Academy and former Vice-Chancellor of the National Law 
School of India University (Bangalore). 
73  ‘Supreme Court and the aam aadmi’ Frontline Vol. 30 (8) (April 20-May 3 2013) 
<http://www.frontline.in> accessed  7 November 2014. 
74  Ibid. See also Balakrishnan Rajagopal 'Pro-Human Rights but Anti-Poor? A Critical Evaluation of 
the Indian Supreme Court from a Social Movement Perspective' (2007) 18 Human Rights Review 
157, 160. 
75  Robinson (n 71) 185. See also S Muralidhar 'Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: An Indian 
Response to the Justiciability Debate' in Yash Ghai and Jill Cottrell (eds) Economic, social and 
cultural rights in practice: the role of judges in implementing economic, social and cultural rights 
(Interights 2004) 23, 31. 
76  A Sengupta ‘Inconsistent decisions’ Frontline Vol. 30(8), 3 May 2013 http://www.frontline.in 
accessed 12 November 2017. 
77  Andrews (n 55) 569. 
78  Malan (n 6) 1970.  
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who is a fit and proper person’ and the constitutional imperative that racial and gender 
diversity be taken into account in the selection process.  But diversity of the bench is a 
priority not just because it lends greater legitimacy to judicial decisions; it also leads to 
better decision-making, decision-making that is responsive to the lived experiences of 
more than a small slice of the population.79 It is important, then, that we separate 
criticisms of the JSC’s appointments that are based purely on a resistance to the very idea 
of demographic transformation of the bench from those that are based on a concern that 
appointments are being made based on how ‘compliant’ the individuals are likely to be to 
governmental preferences. As Geoff Budlender points out: 
There is no need for us to feel any squeamishness about the proposition that the judiciary 
should more clearly reflect who we are. Those considerations are and always will be very 
significant. In the United Kingdom serious work is now being done to attempt to achieve a 
more 'representative' judiciary. The need for a broadly representative judiciary is 
underlined in a society such as ours, which is still so deeply divided on racial grounds.80 
 
 In South Africa, as elsewhere, there is heated debate about what constitutes ‘merit’ 
for the purposes of appointing candidates to the judiciary. Experience is often used as a 
proxy for merit. But, as a consequence of the apartheid government’s discriminatory laws 
and practices, those people with the most experience in the legal profession have tended 
to be white and male. The JSC could not hope to make any serious inroads in terms of 
diversifying the judiciary if they simply continued to appoint judges on the basis of their 
experience. These tensions came to the fore in 2013 when Izak Smuts, a commissioner on 
the JSC, released a discussion document in which he criticised the JSC’s application of 
its appointment criteria particularly on the issue of transformation.81 His view, which 
attracted censure from his colleagues on the JSC, the CJ, other judges and the Black 
Lawyers Association82 was that transformation of the bench was not mandated by the 
Constitution and that the goal of a more representative bench was only a secondary factor 
to be considered in judicial appointments.83 Whilst few would take issue with Smuts’ 
argument that only appropriately qualified individuals should be appointed to the bench 
and that appointments cannot be made on the basis of demographics alone,84 by refusing 
to acknowledge transformation of the bench as a constitutional goal at all, Smuts made it 
easy for detractors to dismiss his more cogent concern with the JSC’s reluctance to 
appoint independent-minded judges.85 
 
As is pointed out by Budlender, the fact that the word ‘transformation’ does not 
                                                 
79  Geoff Budlender ‘Transforming the Judiciary: The Politics of the Judiciary in a Democratic South 
Africa’ 2005 (122) 4 South African Law Journal 715, 717; Sandile Ngcobo ‘Sustaining Public 
Confidence in the Judiciary: An Essential Condition for Realising the Judicial Role’ 2011 (128) 
South African Law Journal 5, 10-11. 
80  Budlender (n 79) 717. 
81  The report is available at <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/the-judiciary-do-white-
males-not-need-apply> accessed 9 April 2017 and discussed in Malan (n 6) 1975. 
82  Malan (n 6) 1976-77. 
83  Malan (n 6) 1975. 
84  Something the JSC itself acknowledges in the criteria for appointment published in 2010, see below. 
85  See interview with Izak Smuts SC regarding his resignation from the JSC at the University of Cape 
Town Law Faculty, 20 April 2013 <https://contextsblog.wordpress.com/2013/04/20/interview-with-
izak-smuts-sc-regarding-his-resignation-from-the-jsc/> accessed 12 November 2017. 
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appear in the Constitution does not diminish the Constitution’s very clear ambition that 
South Africa has a judiciary which is representative of the demographic profile of its 
people.86 Attacks on the transformation agenda itself are unsustainable because they 
contradict this constitutional goal. It is, furthermore, unfortunate that so much of the 
debate about the South African appointments process tends to be reduced to arguments 
about the extent to which race and gender are relevant to appointments processes as this 
shifts the focus away from very serious concerns with judicial independence. The 
appointments process needs to be robust enough to ensure that qualified candidates – of 
whatever race and gender – who will exercise their constitutional mandate independently 
of political influence are appointed to the bench. The preoccupation with race and gender 
also detracts from the broader transformative mission of the Constitution that is, the move 
toward a legal system based on values of substantive equality, dignity and freedom. As 
noted by Budlender, [i]n appointing judges we therefore need to make a fundamental 
issue the assessment of whether they are seriously committed to the profound social 
transformation which is required by the Constitution.’87 The question then arises of how 
best to ensure that the appointments process does a thorough job of assessing 
commitment to key constitutional values.  
 
Increasingly, commentators in India are also calling for judicial appointments 
processes to provide a platform through which judges may be publicly questioned about 
their understanding of, and commitment to, these values.88 Gopal89 and Ramachandran90 
are both swift to clarify that this does not mean that judges are required to adhere to any 
particular social philosophy. However, it is important that the judicial selection process 
take into account the record of candidates in upholding constitutional ideals. As to what 
these ideals are, Gopal suggests that they ‘must include, at the very minimum, 
demonstrated faith in justice (social, economic and political), equality, liberty, dignity 
and the ideas of democracy, socialism and secularism as laid down in the Constitution’.91 
As noted by Olivier in the South African context, the question of how to measure a 
candidate’s commitment to constitutional values is complex.92 An appointments process 
that provides the kind of platform described here will not, in and of itself, lead to a more 
consistent approach to adjudication. But it will contribute to a culture of justification and 
allay escalating concerns about the accountability of judges and the legitimacy of their 
decisions.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
86  Budlender (n 79) 716. 
87  Budlender (n 79) 720. See also See Pierre de Vos ‘Time to talk about the appropriate political role 
of the JSC’ <http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/time-to-talk-about-the-appropriate-political-role-
of-the-jsc/> accessed 12 November 2017 and Olivier (n 118) 451. 
88  Bhushan (n 67) 12. See also Jaising (n 7) 19. 
89  Supra n 48. 
90  Supra n 5. 
91  Gopal (n 49). 
92  Olivier (n 11) 147. 
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4. Steps toward reform: constitutional amendment and civil society 
intervention  
 
Of the two countries, India has seen the more radical recent attempt at reform in the 
shape of the constitutional amendment and the NJAC Act mentioned above. The NJAC 
legislation was not the first attempt at reforming the system for judicial selection and 
appointment.93 In spite of the increasingly forceful demands for change in this area, it 
was only in 2014 that there was sufficient governmental consensus, for new legislation to 
be passed. This was because the 2014 election had given India its first single-party 
majority government in 25 years. The Judicial Appointments Commission put forward in 
the legislation would have consisted of the Chief Justice of India, two other senior-most 
Supreme Court judges, the Union Law Minister, and two eminent persons to be 
nominated by the Prime Minister, CJ and Leader of the Opposition in Parliament. set out 
the procedure to be adopted by the Commission ‘for recommending persons for 
appointment as the Chief Justice of India and other Judges of the Supreme Court and 
Chief Justices and other Judges of High Courts and for their transfers and for matters 
connected therewith or incidental thereto’. Section 5 (2) of the Act stated that ‘[t]he 
Commission shall not recommend a person for appointment if any two members of the 
Commission do not agree for such recommendation.’ With respect to High Court 
appointments, the Act contained similar clauses allowing for ‘other criteria of suitability 
as may be specified by regulations’ to be applied by the Commission and preventing the 
Commission from putting forward a name where two members disagreed with the 
recommendation.  The legislation met with a lukewarm reception. Indira Jaising notes: 
Union Law Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad never tires of stating that the bills fulfil a 24-
year-old demand. This contention is far from true. The long-standing demand has been for 
transparency and public participation, greater representation for women, minorities, 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. The bills introduced in Parliament do not address 
any of these.94 
 
 
A particular issue was the effective power of veto under section 5 of the Act that 
any two members of the Commission could exercise over recommendations. Thus, the 
Law Minister could exercise this power with one of the ‘eminent persons’. As the Act 
provided no guidance as to who would qualify as an ‘eminent person’ it was conceivable 
that this could be someone close to the executive.95 Indeed, the implications of section 5 
for judicial independence featured as one of the main reasons why the Supreme Court 
found the NJAC Act to be unconstitutional.96  
 
                                                 
93  See Jaising (n 7) 18; and M. Ershadul Bari ‘Collegium System of Appointment of Superior Courts' 
Judges Established in India by Way of Judicial Interpretation and the Aftermath: A Critical Study, 
(2013) 18 Lawasia J. 1, 16. 
94  Jaising (n 7) 18. 
95  Ibid. 
96  See the discussion of the judgment in section 4 below. For a summary and critique, see Arghya 
Sengupta ‘Judicial Primacy and the Basic Structure: A Legal Analysis of the NJAC Judgment’ 
Economic and Political Weekly Vol. l No. 48, 28 November 2015, 27. 
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The principal flaws in the NJAC legislation may be divided into four, related 
categories: first, threats to judicial independence; second, inadequate attention paid to 
measures for diversification of the Bench; third, concerns related to impracticability and, 
fourth, a lack of transparency and accountability. Amongst the various criticisms of the 
Acts, the ‘veto’ clauses attracted a wide degree of condemnation. As noted earlier, the 
effect of these clauses was that any two members of the NJAC could have prevented the 
nomination of a candidate. Thus, for instance, the Union Law Minister, acting with one of 
the ‘eminent persons’ could stymie a particular nomination. The two eminent persons 
were to be selected by the Prime Minister, CJ and Leader of the Opposition in Parliament 
and there was no guidance in the legislation as to what counts as ‘eminence’. 
Consequently, it was conceivable that the government could place pressure on the CJ in 
the selection of ‘eminent persons’ adding to the capacity of the executive to dominate the 
appointments process. 97  
 
A further concern was that the legislation allowed the NJAC to overlook the 
seniority principle in the appointment of the CJ on the grounds of a lack of merit or 
ability. There may be good reasons for superseding the senior-most judge when 
appointing the CJ.98 However, ‘[i]n the absence of any methodology for judging ability 
and merit, this provision could end up packing the judiciary with “friendly” judges.’99 
The fact that the legislation conferred wide Parliamentary powers to change the criteria 
and process for judicial selection also set alarm bells ringing over the potential extent of 
governmental control over judicial appointments.100  
 
 With respect to diversity, the clause requiring that one of the ‘eminent’ persons be 
‘nominated from amongst the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled 
Tribes, Other Backward Classes, Minorities or Women’ was a step in the right direction. 
However, merit and ability remained the primary selection criteria together with others 
that may be specified in regulations. The lack of engagement with what ‘merit’ and 
‘ability’ mean in the context of judicial office is problematic. Jaising notes that the 
‘merit’ criterion has historically been used to exclude marginalised members of society 
from the Bench. Furthermore, she notes that the legislation did not even contain a 
‘statement of intent’ recognising the need to make diversity a priority in judicial 
selection.101  
 
                                                 
97  See Jaising (n 14) 18; Khagesh Gautam ‘Constitutionality of the National Judicial Appointments 
Commission: The Originalist Argument’, <http://www.nja.nic.in/P-950_Reading_Material_5-NOV-
15/4.%20Khagesh%20Gautam.pdf> accessed 12 November 2017; C Raj Kumar and Khagesh 
Gautam ‘Questions of Constitutionality - The National Judicial Appointments Commission’, 
Economic and Political Weekly, 27 June 2015. 
98  To enhance continuity on the bench for instance – see Pillay (n 70) 354. 
99  Jaising (n 14) 18. 
100  Smaran Shetty ‘Questioning the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014’  
<https://lawandotherthings.blogspot.co.uk/2014/08/questioning-national-judicial.html> accessed 12 
November 2017. See also Manoj Mate ‘A Challenge to Judicial Independence in India: The National 
Judicial Appointments Council (NJAC)’, Jurist (23 July 2015) 
<http://www.jurist.org/forum/2015/07/manoj-mate-judicial-independence.php> accessed 12 
November 2017. 
101  Jaising (n 14) 18.  
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 Apart from their potential impact on judicial independence, the clauses allowing 
any two members of the NJAC an effective veto over a candidate’s selection have also 
been critiqued on the basis that they could impede judicial appointments in general. 
Kumar and Gautam refer to the possibility of a constitutional crisis precipitated by 
repeated exercises of the veto power by two members of the NJAC and made more likely 
by the fact that the legislation did not give any guidelines as to what an appropriate 
reason for rejecting a candidate would be.102 In addition, the NJAC legislation contained 
no guidelines for resolving conflicts between the rules emanating from the JAC and those 
determined by central government.103  
 
Finally, a lack of transparency pervaded the legislation itself and the overall result 
was that the NJAC system for judicial appointments was only slightly less opaque than 
that of the collegium.  In addition to the fact that the legislation provided no clarity 
around the meaning of ‘eminent’ person or any guidelines as to how merit and ability 
would be assessed, the Acts did not contain any provisions requiring public 
participation104 in the form of inviting members of the public or interested professional 
bodies to comment on proposed candidates or in the form of a public interview process 
for prospective judges, for instance.  The legislation also did not contain any clauses, 
such as one creating a complaints mechanism, designed to enhance judicial 
accountability.105  
 
For these reasons, the Supreme Court’s decision that the NJAC legislation was 
unconstitutional was welcomed in many quarters.106 At the same time, the Court’s 
reasoning in the judgment has come under fire from various commentators, including 
some who were themselves critical of the legislation.107 The judgment is long and 
complex. Detailed summaries of the court’s treatment of all the issues are available 
elsewhere.108 The focus here is on the court’s dicta regarding judicial independence.  
                                                 
102  Kumar and Gautam (n 97). 
103  Shetty (n 100). 
104  See the ‘residuary clause’ – section 11(2)(c). See also Jaising (n 14); and Shetty (n 100). 
105  Jaising (n 14) 18. See also ‘Sunlight is the best disinfectant’ Economic and Political Weekly 
Editorial, 30 January 2010. 
106  See, for instance, Pratap Bhanu Mehta ‘A lesser evil: Collegium has grave deficiencies, but it 
compromises structural independence of judiciary less’, The Indian Express, 17 October 2015, 
<http://indianexpress.com/> accessed 12 November 2017; Ajoy Ashirwad Mahaprashasta ‘The 
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<http://www.frontline.in> accessed 12 November 2017 (Bhushan appeared for the Supreme Court 
Advocates-on-Record Association in the case).  
107  For example, Gautam Bhatia ‘The NJAC Judgment and its Discontents’, 16 October 2015, 
<https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/10/16/the-njac-judgment-and-its-discontents/> accessed 
12 November 2017; Chintan Chandrachud ‘Debating the NJAC Judgment of the Supreme Court of 
India: Three Dimensions’ U.K. Const. L. Blog, 3rd Nov 2015 < 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2015/11/03/chintan-chandrachud-debating-the-njac-judgment-of-the-
supreme-court-of-india-three-dimensions/> accessed 12 November 2017; Sengupta (n 96); 
‘Appointment of Judges and the Basic Structure Doctrine in India’ , (2016) Law Quarterly Review 
201 (Sengupta appeared for the Union of India in the case); Rehan Abeyratne ‘Upholding Judicial 
Supremacy in India: The NJAC Judgment in Comparative Perspective’ (2016-2017) 49 Geo. Wash. 
Int'l L. Rev. 569. 
108  Bhatia (n 107). See also Chandrachud (n 107); and Sengupta (n 96 and n 67). 
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The main judgment was written by Justice Khehar. In it, he held that the NJAC 
legislation did not provide for ‘adequate representation to the judicial component in the 
NJAC’, that the legislation was inadequate to preserve judicial primacy in the judicial 
selection and appointments process and that it therefore constituted a violation of the 
independence of the judiciary.109 Justice Khehar acknowledged the remarks made by Dr 
B.R Ambedkar, amongst others, during the Constitutional Assembly debates indicating 
that an effective veto over judicial appointments by the CJ was as problematic as 
executive dominance over the process.110  However, he went on to find that the 
Memoranda of Procedure for Appointment of Judges, Chief Justices and Supreme Court 
Judges devised following the decisions in the First and Second Judges cases did not give 
the CJ such power. Instead, the memoranda demanded that both judicial and executive 
actors participate in a consultative process and that, as their views were expressed in 
writing, this process was also transparent.111 Justice Khehar reasoned that the allegation 
that the independence of the judiciary, part of the basic structure of the Constitution, had 
been infringed by the NJAC legislation had to be assessed by asking whether the 
legislation preserved judicial primacy in the selection and appointments process.112 There 
were two main reasons for the conclusion that it did not.  
 
 First, Justice Khehar found that the idea that any two members of the NJAC could 
prevent the appointment of a candidate to be ‘obnoxious’ as it allowed two lay persons to 
‘override the collective wisdom of the Chief Justice of India and two Judges of the 
Supreme Court of India’.113 Second, the presence of the Union Law Minister on the 
NJAC was problematic because the executive had a vested interest in a majority of the 
cases brought before the higher courts.114 Ultimately, then, Khehar held, for the majority, 
that ‘the role assigned to the political-executive, can at best be limited to a collaborative 
participation, excluding any role in the final determination’.115 Having canvassed the 
approaches of a range of jurisdictions, Khehar noted that the trend was to move towards 
reducing the role of the executive in judicial appointments and the participation of 
various executive actors in the judicial appointments process in India was, therefore, an 
unacceptable ‘retrograde step’.116  
 
Concerns with the potential veto power of any two persons on the NJAC and with 
the participation of the Law Minister featured prominently in the separate, concurring 
judgments of Justices Lokur, Joseph and Goel.117  It is noteworthy that several of the 
                                                 
109  Khehar J, par. 158 (Order on Merits). 
110  Discussed in section 2 above. 
111  Khehar J, pars. 65-72 and 80 (Reference Order). 
112  Khehar J, par. 150 (Order on Merits). 
113  Khehar J, par. 156 (Order on Merits). In addition, as Art. 124A(1)(d) did not set out the 
qualifications for eminence, leaving the selection of these two individuals to the Chief Justice, Prime 
Minister and Leader of the Opposition in Parliament, it was found to be too vague to withstand 
constitutional scrutiny - Khehar J, par. 182 (Order on Merits). 
114  Khehar J, par. 167 (Order on Merits). 
115  Khehar J, par 169 (Order on Merits). 
116  Khehar J, par. 178 (Order on Merits) 
117  See Lokur J, pars. 484-86; 491, 509 and 523; Goel J, pars. 19.4 and 19.13; Joseph J, 909. 
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judges expressed criticism of the current process for judicial appointments. Justice Joseph 
noted that the current collegium system lacked transparency, accountability and 
objectivity.118  Justice Lokur also referred to ‘ills’ in the system but noted that the 
political executive shared the blame for deficiencies with the collegium.119 In his 
dissenting judgment, Justice Chelameswar referred to a general lack of transparency and 
accountability in the collegium system.120 Justice Chelameswar’s dissent was based in 
part on his disagreement with the premise that judicial primacy in the judicial 
appointments process is the only mean through which to secure judicial independence.121 
He noted that representatives of the executive and of civil society may each bring useful 
input and expertise to the process and that the formal participation of such individuals in 
the selection and appointment of judges is common in other democracies.122 A key aspect 
of his finding that the Amendment withstood constitutional scrutiny was that it did not 
give the executive the primary say over judicial appointments as any proposals emanating 
from the Minster could be rejected by other members of the NJAC.123  
 
Justice Chelameswar proposed a safeguard in response to the concern that 
disagreement over the appointment of eminent persons could block the appointments 
process. In terms of this safeguard, the three-person Committee responsible for selecting 
the eminent persons would refer three names under each category of eminent person to 
the full bench of the Supreme Court. The Court would then vote on these names, the two 
with the highest number of votes going on to become members of the NJAC.124 This 
approach may be contrasted with the other judges’ insistence on a far greater level of 
precision in the legislation in order for it to pass constitutional scrutiny.125 
 
This difference between approaches points to a broader issue. As Chandrachud 
points out: 
The Court had a large set of interpretive tools at its disposal to deal with these and other 
concerns without striking down the amendment. For instance, it could have restricted the 
application of the veto provision to the judges alone, granted the Chief Justice a veto power 
in the process for appointing eminent persons, or defined ‘eminent persons’ more 
narrowly.126  
Chandrachud is not convinced by Justice Lokur’s opinion that the Court had to avoid 
these kinds of interpretive solutions because they would lead to judicial overreach.127 He 
notes that concerns about judicial overreach are more likely to be present when the Court 
chooses to strike down an amendment to the Constitution passed by Parliament rather 
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than preserve its constitutionality by using interpretive tools ordinarily at the Court’s 
disposal.128 Chandrachud’s view, borne out by the separate concurring judgments, is that 
the refusal to use interpretive tools stemmed from fundamental differences between the 
judges on key questions such as whether ‘eminent persons’ should be included on the 
NJAC and whether it was constitutionally permissible to require that one of the eminent 
persons come from a protected class.129  
 
Even more significantly, there were serious inconsistencies in the judges’ reasoning 
on the relationship between judicial independence, judicial primacy in the appointments 
process and the basic structure of the Constitution.130 For Justices Khehar131 and Goel,132 
judicial primacy was essential to judicial independence and, thus, part of the basic 
structure of the Constitution. Neither Justices Lokur nor Joseph reached the definitive 
conclusion that judicial primacy in the appointment of judges was an element of the basic 
structure of the Constitution.133 Justice Joseph’s judgment contained no reference to this 
issue at all. Justice Lokur went to great lengths to emphasise that the process for judicial 
appointments envisaged in the Constitution was, for the most part, a ‘consultative and 
participatory’ one involving various constitutional functionaries,134 with ‘limited 
primacy’ being accorded to the view of the judiciary, as represented by the CJ.135 He was 
clearly uncomfortable with the idea of primacy – either of the executive or the judiciary – 
in the appointments process.136 Sengupta is of the view that the absence of a clear 
majority decision on the question of whether judicial primacy in the appointments system 
is essential to the preservation of judicial independence leaves the door open for 
Parliament to pass legislation introducing a judicial appointments commission with 
similar features to those of the NJAC at some point in the future.137 Civil society support 
for a more transparent system for the appointment of judges may also keep up the 
pressure on government to introduce new legislation at some point.  
 
Following the decision, the Court asked that government draft a Memorandum of 
Procedure on, amongst other things, how the existing collegium-based process for 
judicial appointments may be improved.138 After a long period of negotiation between 
government and the judges about the substance of this memorandum,139 there have been 
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recent indications of progress.140 However, there is, as yet, no final agreement.141 This 
prolonged disagreement, taken together with the majority judges’ refusal to apply 
interpretive tools to preserve the constitutionality of the legislation in the NJAC case, 
indicate that the issue of how to reform the judicial selection process in India is as 
controversial as ever. In this context, the South African experience of judicial 
appointments post-apartheid may hold valuable lessons on the relationship between 
judicial appointments and the independence of the judiciary. 
 
 There is little chance that a constitutional amendment changing the composition of 
the JSC will see the light of day in the current South African political climate. Thus, 
suggestions for reform have been of a more modest nature. One idea that has taken hold 
in South Africa in recent years is that of making the deliberations of the JSC public. Such 
an argument was made in a case brought against the JSC by the Helen Suzman 
Foundation in 2013.142 In this case, the Foundation sought access to full recordings of the 
JSC’s deliberations in deciding to put forward certain candidates and not others for 
vacancies in the Western Cape Division of the High Court. At the heart of the case was 
the Foundation’s unhappiness with the JSC’s decision to put forward Dolamo AJ rather 
than Jeremy Gauntlett SC for a permanent appointment to the bench. The Foundation 
argued that reasons provided to a candidate whose application has been unsuccessful 
were inadequate as the drafter of the reasons has the power to tailor the summary of the 
deliberations and exclude important or controversial information.  Following an 
examination of comparable jurisdictions, the court held that it was not convinced by this 
argument. It highlighted the need to protect the privacy of applicants and to ensure 
deliberations be as candid as possible. The court also noted that candidates should not be 
deterred from taking part because of an overly public process. The National Association 
of Democratic Lawyers (NADEL) and the Democratic Governance and Rights Unit 
(DGRU) were admitted as amicus curiae in the case. Both rejected the idea that public 
deliberations were best practice when it came to judicial appointments by a commission. 
The case highlights the fact that South Africa’s judicial selection and appointment 
processes are, by international standards, extremely transparent. But it also raises the 
question of how those aspects of the process that do take place in the public gaze may be 
strengthened.  
 
 There are three major, related issues here: one is clarity on the appointments 
criteria, the second is the question of how much information is available to the JSC and 
the public about the candidates; and the third is consistency around how interviews are 
conducted. DGRU is an applied research unit based at the University of Cape Town and 
has been active in promoting rigour and transparency in judicial appointments since 
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around 2008. Although DGRU was one of the groups arguing against making 
deliberations of the JSC public in the Helen Suzman case, it has pressed for greater 
transparency with respect to the criteria the body uses in its selection. Initially, the JSC 
was not especially forthcoming on this. Using access to information legislation, DGRU 
made an application (through the Open Democracy Advice Centre) for the JSC to 
disclose its selection criteria– and received an extremely vague response in April 2009. 
The Commission said that the factors used 
[I]nclude but are not limited to the recommendation of the Judge President, the support  of  
the  candidate’s  professional  body,  the  need  to  fulfill  the  constitutional mandate  of  
the  Judicial  Service Commission  so  as  to  ensure  transformation  of  the Bench to 
reflect the ethnic and gender composition of the population, the particular judicial needs of 
the division concerned, the candidate’s age and range of expertise, including whether 
he/she has served as an acting judge in the division or at all, and the relative strengths and 
merits of the various candidates in relation to one another.’143 
 
 In a 2010 research report on Judicial Selection in South Africa, Susannah Cowen, 
an Advocate at the Cape and Johannesburg Bars and research associate of DGRU,144 
drew on best practice in a range of jurisdictions to set out much more comprehensive 
criteria.145 In her discussion of what constitutes a ‘fit and proper person’, Cowen 
emphasised the point that a demonstrated commitment to constitutional values may 
provide a strong indication of independence from political institutions. The idea that 
commitment to constitutional values is an essential element of what makes a candidate fit 
for the job is underlined by the fact that the Constitution is avowedly transformative146 – 
that it is based on the idea of ‘a conscious attempt to create a nation that would espouse 
and accomplish substantive justice in its political and economic facets.’147 The text itself 
contains references to the notion of the Constitution as an instrument of social change – 
primarily in the Preamble, section 1, section 7 and section 9(2). The inclusion of 
economic and social rights such as those in sections 26 (housing) and 27 (health care, 
food, water and social security) also speak to the notion of the Constitution as a blueprint 
for social equality.  
 
In 2010, the JSC eventually decided to publish more detailed criteria for 
appointment. According to the JSC document, the main criteria in section 174 were to be 
interpreted as inviting the commissioners to ask the following questions about each 
candidate: 
1. Is the particular applicant an appropriately qualified person? 
2. Is he or she a fit and proper person, and 
3. Would his or her appointment help to reflect the racial and gender 
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composition of South Africa?148 
The commissioners would then move on to a set of supplementary criteria or questions: 
1. Is the proposed appointee a person of integrity? 
2. Is the proposed appointee a person with the necessary energy and 
motivation? 
3. Is the proposed appointee a competent person? 
(a) Technically competent 
(b) Capacity to give expression to the values of the Constitution 
4. Is the proposed appointee an experienced person? 
(a) Technically experienced 
(b) Experienced in regard to values and needs of the community 
5. Does the proposed appointee possess appropriate potential? 
6. Symbolism. What message is given to the community at large by a particular 
appointment?149 
The published criteria are not just more comprehensive; they also make it clear that 
commitment to constitutional values or ‘capacity to give expression to the values of the 
Constitution’ is important in considering a candidate’s suitability for appointment.  
 
 Transparency of the decision-making process was also a key concern in the case of 
Judicial Service Commission v Cape Bar Council.150 The issue was the failure by the JSC 
to fill two of the three vacancies on the Western Cape High Court bench after 
interviewing seven candidates.151 The fact that the one candidate appointed in that 
process was black and the other six white added fuel to the controversy.152 Three of the 
short-listed candidates who were not appointed were supported by the Cape Bar Council 
as meeting the criteria for suitability in section 174 (1).153 The JSC did not dispute the 
suitability of these candidates, stating simply that they were not appointed because they 
did not receive enough votes from the commissioners.154 Writing for a unanimous court, 
Brand JA held: 
I am not suggesting that the JSC is under an obligation to give reasons under all 
circumstances for each and every one of the myriad of potential decisions it has to take. 
Suffice it for present purposes to say that: (a) since the JSC is under a constitutional 
obligation to act rationally and transparently in deciding whether or not to recommend 
candidates for judicial appointment, it follows that, as a matter of general principle, it is 
obliged to give reasons for its decision not to do so; (b) the response that the particular 
candidate did not garner enough votes, does not meet that general obligation, because it 
amounts to no reason at all; (c) in a case such as this, where the undisputed facts gave rise 
to a prima facie inference that the decision not to recommend any of the suitable candidates 
was irrational, the failure by the JSC to adhere to its general duty to give reasons inevitably 
leads to confirmation of that prima facie inference. In the event, I agree with the finding by 
the court a quo that the failure by the JSC on 12 April 2011 not to fill any of the two 
vacancies on the bench of the WCHC was irrational and unlawful.155  
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 These attempts to bolster the transparency of the judicial appointments process are 
extremely positive and speak well of the state of judicial independence in the country. 
However, more recent and lasting critiques have been levelled against the manner on 
which JSC interviews are conducted, particularly when it comes to rigour and 
consistency of the questioning by commissioners. One of the major concerns related to 
early JSC interviews was an information gap with respect to the candidates’ previous 
work. This was a significant issue in the Kliptown interviews for the selection of CJ and 
four new Constitutional Court judges which took place in September 2009.156  A group of 
civil society organisations – including DGRU in the early stages of its development – 
attempted to fill this gap by providing a document containing a statistical analysis of 
judgments of candidates who had previously acted as judges, as well as extracts from 
their judgments. The document did not contain any information about the advocates 
(barristers) and academics who were being interviewed. Gathering material on the careers 
of these candidates would have taken a much longer time and the document referenced in 
the Kliptown proceedings was produced in a hurry. Cowen notes, however, that the JSC 
made extensive use of the material that was included in the report.157  
 
As DGRU has expanded its work and become more established, it is fulfilling the 
role of information-gatherer in a more serious way. One of the unit’s important 
contributions is the compilation of reports providing (in the main) summaries of selected 
judgments delivered by each of the candidates. DGRU makes these reports available to 
the JSC before the interviews take place. The reports are intended to provide non-partisan 
information for the JSC. Thus, as far as is possible, the reports use the judges’ own words 
in summarising decisions and provide no commentary or analysis of their own. The 
reports also comment briefly on previous rounds of JSC interviews. Over the years, 
DGRU’s reports have become increasingly detailed – they now include summaries of 
judgments handed down by advocates who have acted as judges; and extracts from 
journal articles authored by candidates.158 Since February 2013, DGRU researchers have 
presented the summarised judgments in thematic groups.159 This methodological shift 
may prove to be useful – not only because it highlights the candidates’ substantive 
findings in particular areas but provides the JSC with a sense of which candidates have 
experience and strength in particular areas of the law. Cowen’s point regarding a dearth 
of information about candidates who have not served as judges in either a permanent or 
acting capacity holds and her suggestion that applicants be required to provide more 
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extensive source material in their applications deserves to be taken seriously.160 Overall, 
though, the ‘information gap’ with respect to candidates’ suitability is being much more 
effectively addressed.   
 
A more worrying critique relates to the inconsistency in the approach taken by JSC 
commissioners to the questioning of candidates – long, arduous interviews for certain 
candidates and a much gentler approach to questioning others.161 Some suggest that the 
difference is rooted in whether the particular candidate is perceived to be more 
independent-minded with the most grueling interviews reserved for those in this 
category.162 Others see the difference in approach as a reflection of profound 
disagreement amongst the commissioners on how the appointment criteria are to be 
interpreted and applied.163 As noted earlier, the current CJ Mogoeng Mogoeng’s 
appointment in 2011 was mired in controversy.164 Objections to his nomination related to 
a series of judgments handed down by him that were both sexist and indicative of a lack 
of understanding of changes wrought by the transition to a constitutional democracy - for 
instance that marital rape is now recognised as a crime in South Africa.165 Furthermore, 
the CJ is a lay pastor at Winners’ Chapel, the local branch of David Oyedepo Ministries 
International, which considers homosexuality to be a disease which can be cured.166 In 
the context of a Constitution that explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, this is deeply problematic.  
 
Observers were divided on whether Justice Mogoeng’s interview was sufficiently 
rigorous but there are some who claim that the questions were, for the most part, 
undemanding.167 He was not seriously interrogated on his problematic judicial decisions 
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on rape, for example. This has fueled a perception that the interviews are window 
dressing, the important decisions about appointments having been made before they take 
place. Calland and Oxtoby suggest that this may be one reason for the current difficulty 
with getting qualified individuals to apply for judicial positions in the country.168 Despite 
these concerns about the interview process and the manner in which the current CJ was 
appointed, it should be borne in mind that the very public nature of the process and the 
criticism has made an important contribution to protecting judicial independence. 
 
For one thing, the public uproar surrounding the proceedings resulted in an 
unusually well-attended interview which, as Calland points out, can only be a good thing 
from the perspective of accountability to the public.169 The CJ’s statements and decisions 
on gender and sexual orientation are likely to be heavily scrutinised and, again, this is no 
bad thing. Following his appointment, Mogoeng CJ took to the media to underline his 
commitment to the Constitution’s protection of equality and, specifically, non-
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.170 Finally, whatever his relationship 
with the government before his appointment, the CJ has subsequently voiced 
disenchantment over executive backtracking on the creation of courts’ administration 
independent of the executive.171 As Calland states, the executive has ‘starved the Office 
of the Chief Justice (OCJ) of funding, placing one of its own staff (a senior justice 
department official) into the crucial position of secretary-general of the OCJ. This has 
strengthened Mogoeng’s determination to stand up to the executive and he finally lost his 
cool and expressed his anger at a meeting with the president and the minister of justice in 
early 2013.’172 
 
Since 2012, DGRU reports have suggested that rigour and consistency in the 
interview process are improving. Thus, the Unit’s April 2014 submission commended the 
‘fair and balanced questioning’ in the October 2013 interviews.173 A similar point was 
made in DGRU’s September 2015 submission regarding the rigorous interviews 
conducted in April 2015, particularly with respect to the interviews for leadership 
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positions on the courts.174 Despite these promising signs, a lack of clarity over selection 
criteria used by the JSC is an enduring worry. Budlender notes that, when the first judges 
of the Constitutional Court were appointed in 1994, demonstrated commitment to human 
rights was a pre-requisite for appointment. This is ‘entirely appropriate under a 
Constitution in which a commitment to human rights suffuses the founding values 
entirely appropriate under a Constitution in which a commitment to human rights 
suffuses the founding values’.175 The supplementary criteria referred to in the JSC’s 2010 
criteria, referred to above, support the notion that candidates should be able to give 
expression to the values of the Constitution. Yet commentators have noted that a 
candidate’s commitment to human rights may be viewed as suspect by the JSC.176 Thus, 
in relation to the April 2014 interviews, Oxtoby notes the comment by one commissioner 
that she found it ‘disturbing’ that candidates with ‘fervent human rights activist 
tendencies’ wished to be judges.177 Some candidates with a strong record of commitment 
to human rights continue to be appointed but the comment does raise concerns about the 
JSC’s own understanding and application of selection criteria. 
 
Arguably, the underlying issue here is not commitment to human rights per se but 
the likelihood of the particular candidate finding against government, the idea being that 
in the current South African climate, human rights activism would place an individual in 
opposition to various governmental policies. Referring to an instance of a candidate being 
told that he seemed to find against government in a large number of cases and then being 
asked to cite examples of cases where he had found for the government, Oxtoby raises 
the concern that commissioners’ questions about candidates’ understanding of the 
separation of powers may simply be intended to identify and exclude those who appear 
too independent-minded.178 Similarly, a commitment to transformation (demonstrated by 
an advocate briefing colleagues from ‘previously disadvantaged backgrounds’, for 
instance) is viewed in a positive light provided that such commitment is not expressed in 
a manner that could be seen to be hostile to government.179 
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5. South Africa: a cautionary tale? 
 
On paper, the South African system of judicial selection and appointment is dominated 
by the executive. When it comes to appointing the CJ, Deputy Chief Justice, President of 
the SCA and Deputy-President of the SCA, this dominance is most pronounced. It is up 
to the President to select individuals for these positions, the only formal limitation on this 
power being the requirement of consultation with the JSC (and with the leader of parties 
represented in the National Assembly with respect to the CJ and DCJ). This concentration 
of power in the hands of the President has been criticised – perhaps most prominently by 
then Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke.180 The fact that politicians and political 
appointees make up a majority of the commissioners on the JSC is also cause for some 
unease. Disquiet over these limitations on judicial independence arising from the 
appointments process have been heightened by several instances of more explicit 
executive challenges to judicial power. 
 
 One notable early example of such a challenge arose in relation to the Treatment 
Action Campaign case,181 dealing with a challenge to government’s decision to limit the 
provision of the anti-retroviral drug nevirapine to prevent mother-to-child transmission of 
the HI virus to certain pilot sites. After the High Court had ruled against government, the 
then Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang was asked in a televised interview 
whether government would abide by the court’s order.  She answered that it would not, 
explaining that: 
My own view is that the judiciary cannot prescribe from the bench - and that we have a 
regulatory authority in this country that is interacting with the regulatory authority FDA 
[Food and Drugs Administration] of the USA and I think we must allow them to assist us 
in reaching conclusions…I think the court and judiciary must also listen to the regulatory 
authority both of this country and the regulatory authority of the US.’ 182  
Her response caused a furore in the country and she was quickly made to retract the 
statement.183 Furthermore, her statement did not prevent the Constitutional Court from 
finding against government when the High Court’s decision was appealed  in what 
Budlender has referred to as ‘[t]he most famous incident in our country of the courts 
declaring a policy inconsistent with the Constitution’.184 
 
 Since then, and particularly during Jacob Zuma’s presidency, the executive has 
become more vocal in its criticism of the courts and less apologetic for its statements 
critiquing particular judicial decisions and the judiciary as an institution. Thus, for 
instance, Siyo and Mubangizi refer to ‘periodic statements by politicians about the need 
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to review the judgments of the Constitutional Court with a view to assessing the need to 
make changes to the Constitution.’185 The repeated criticism of the judiciary by the 
executive led heads of courts to hold an extraordinary meeting in 2015, after which they 
issued the following statement: 
The Heads of Court and senior judges of all divisions have requested the Chief Justice, as 
head of the judiciary to meet with the head of state to point out and discuss the dangers of 
the repeated and unfounded criticism of the judiciary. Criticism of that kind has the 
potential to delegitimise the courts. Courts serve a public purpose and should not be 
undermined.186 
 
At the same time, it is worth noting both that executive criticism of the judiciary is 
to be expected and is not unique to South Africa. More importantly, this criticism has not 
deterred South African courts – the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, in particular – from robustly scrutinising executive action and finding against 
government in a number of high-profile decisions.187 One recent and very significant 
decision was Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly (the 
Nkandla case),188 in which Mogoeng CJ found, for a unanimous Constitutional Court, 
that President Zuma’s failure to comply with the Public Protector’s order to reimburse the 
National Treasury for those improvements made to his home that were not security-
related was unconstitutional.189 Furthermore, Ellmann points out that, despite 
governmental criticism: 
The courts enjoy some considerable degree of respect—and that position gives the courts 
some potential to speak effectively to power, even though the ANC’s political power is still 
immense. Moreover, this respect is likely founded on the courts’ being the objective voice 
of the law and of the culture of justification—and these sources of the courts’ legitimacy 
themselves generate the courts’ obligation to continue to act.190  
 
On the whole, then, whilst we cannot afford to be complacent about the future of 
judicial independence and the rule of law in South Africa, over twenty years after the 
country’s first democratic elections, the courts are still able to fulfil their constitutional 
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duty without fear, favour or prejudice. When it comes to the judicial appointments 
system, developments in South Africa are indicative of the fact that formal safeguards of 
independence such as ensuring that a range of actors have a genuine say over which 
candidates are ultimately selected are important. However, even in a system such as 
South Africa’s where judicial selection is formally weighted in favour of the will of the 
politicians, transparency of the process has acted as a hugely important assurance of 
judicial independence. Scrutiny of the President’s actions and the practices of the JSC by 
the media, academics, civil society and the public is robust and has proved to be effective 
at key moments. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Based on his study of judicial appointments processes in Commonwealth 
jurisdictions, Jan van Zyl Smit notes that, when it comes to the composition of 
commissions, the tide ‘is turning towards the balanced model’. By ‘balanced model’, van 
Zyl Smit is referring to commissions in which judges do not constitute a majority of 
commission members. Rather, the majority of members is made up ‘of judges and 
lawyers chosen by the practising or academic branches of the legal profession’.191 Even 
here, he acknowledges that members of the judiciary and senior members of the legal 
profession could act together to protected vested common interests.192 This underscores 
the fact that there is no perfect judicial appointments system, capable of ensuring – in and 
of itself – that judicial independence is secured. Furthermore, any consideration of 
possible routes to reform must take account of practical realities. As noted earlier, any 
reform involving a constitutional amendment in South Africa is unlikely to gain traction 
for as long as the ANC maintains its majority in Parliament. In this context, clarity of 
appointments criteria and access to relevant information about candidates are emerging 
organically – through public pressure, the work of organisations and lobbying by interest 
groups. 
 
 
It is not clear what set of circumstances would allow for successful reform of the 
judicial selection and appointments system in India. What is worrying about the Indian 
Supreme Court’s NJAC judgment is its lack of nuance about what judicial independence 
means. The NJAC would not have had a majority of politicians as its members.  Given 
that the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition would have competing political 
agendas, the worry that they would act together to pressure the CJ into choosing 
particular individuals to act as commissioners was not convincing. The idea that the 
Prime Minister could act together with one of the ‘eminent’ persons to block particular 
appointments was of greater concern. However, there are two points to be made here. 
First, experience of judicial appointments in India has shown that the CJ is not immune 
from pressure from the ruling party in the current collegium system. Second, and more 
importantly, the flaw could have been addressed if the criteria for ‘eminent persons’ were 
made more clear. But these issues were not properly canvassed in the judgment. At least 
two of the judges – Justices Khehar and Goel –  were explicitly unwilling to move away 
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from a system that ensured judicial primacy over judicial appointments. And none of the 
four judges who delivered the majority judgment were willing to use a remedy that would 
have allowed government the opportunity to address deficiencies in the legislation such 
as the lack of clarity over appointments criteria. As a result of this judgment, the opaque 
collegium system for judicial appointments in India continues in force and it may be 
some time before agreement is reached on reform.  
 
For a country like India where the blueprint for a new judicial appointments system 
is still open to debate, judicial independence would not be well-served by a system that 
simply replaces judicial primacy with political dominance. The history of South Africa 
over the last twenty years shows that concentrating power over judicial appointments in 
the hands of the President or allowing politicians a decisive say over which candidates 
are ultimately selected can lead to candidates being appointed on the basis of a perception 
that they will be more ‘friendly’ to governmental policies. Even if that perception is not 
borne out in reality, the danger is a loss of respect for the judiciary and the loss of the 
expertise of more obviously independent-minded candidates.  But, and perhaps more 
importantly, the South African experience also attests to the importance of having a 
transparent process – the public nature of the JSC interviews have acted as a hugely 
important safeguard of judicial independence. Clarity of appointments criteria and 
ensuring that the body responsible for selection of judges has access to a wide range of 
information about the candidates have also emerged as key ingredients for a healthy 
judicial appointments system. This lends credence to the argument by critics of the NJAC 
legislation that it was simply too vague on these important matters.  It is difficult to say 
what the composition of a potential future commission would have to be in order to pass 
constitutional muster as there is so little guidance in the judgment on this. What is clear, 
though, is that the composition of any future judicial appointments commission is only 
one part of the equation. Much greater attention must be paid to clarity of the criteria for 
appointment as well as transparency of, and public participation in, the decision making 
process.   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
